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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

AMERICAN MANUFACTURERS MUTUAL,
Plaintiff and
Respondent,
vs.
RESORT CAMPERS, LTD.

I

et al,

Defendants
and
ROGER T. RUSSELL, et al,
Defendants and
Appellants

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

No. 18262
No. 18263

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT AND CROSS APPELLANT

NATURE OF THE CASE
Plaintiff conunenced this action seeking a declaratory
judgment that its maximum liability on a motor vehicle dealer's
bond, issued by plaintiff in accordance with §41-3-16 Utah Code
Annotated, 1953, as revised and amended, is limited to the sum of
$20,000.
DISPOSITION OF LOWER COURT
The district court ruled that the provisions of the
motor vehicle dealer's bond statute, §41-3-16 Utah Code Annotated
(1953) must be read in connection with the bond to determine the
nature and extent of the surety's liability.

-1-

The district court
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held that the sum of $20,000 is the total limit of the bonding
company's· liability, regardless of the number of separate claims
and the total amount of losses claimed during a bond protection
period.

In addition, the court determined that the bonding com-

pany was liable for the sum of $20·,ooo total for each of two
periods, those periods being October 31, 1978 to October 31, 1979
and October 31, 1979 to April 12, 1980.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff requests the court to affirm those parts of
the declaratory judgment of the trial court holding that the bond
must be read in connection with the statute and that the total
limit of plaintiff's liability during a bond protection period is
$20,000 regardless of the number or the amount of claims.

On

cross-appeal, plaintiff seeks to reverse the court's ruling that
it is liable for the sum of $20,000 for each of the two periods
in question, or for each period that a premium was paid on the
bond.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On October 31, 1978, American Manufacturers Mutual
Insurance Company issued a $20,000 bond, No. 8SE296415 (Ex. 1),
on behalf of Dick and Lavonne Noren d/b/a Central RV Sales in
accordance with §41-3-16 Utah Code Annotated (1953) and received
a $400 premium therefor.

On October 31, 1979, the bond was

renewed by Dick and Lavonne Noren d/b/a Central RV Sales, for
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which another $400 premium was received.
All motor vehicle dealerships are required to obtain
such a bond pursuant to §41-3-16 Utah Code Annotated (1953).
Premiums for these type of bonds are set at a $2.00 per $100 rate
thus requiring a $400 premium for a $20,000 bond.

(T. 32)

In

calculating the premium, no consideration is given to the sales
volume or size of a motor vehicle dealership because it is the
understanding in the surety industry that a surety's maximum
liability is $20,000.

(T. 51, 63)

The bond form used in this case was provided to plaintiff by the Utah Motor Vehicles Business Administration as a
regular form printed by the State for use by any surety company
willing to.issue this kind of bond.

The form of the bond was

approved by the Attorney General's Office of the State of Utah,.
as required by §41-3-16 Utah Code Annotated (1953).

Any

deviation from this bond form would have been rejected by the
Utah Motor Vehicle Business Administration, unless it was
approved by the Attorney General's Office.

(T. 80 I

86)

It was the understanding of the surety industry as well
as the Director of the Utah Motor Vehicles Business
Administration that the total aggregate liability of a surety who
issues such bonds is $20,000 regardless of the number of
claimants or the amount of the claims.

(T. 63, 71, 83, 99)

Plaintiff's representative testified that this was also
plaintiff's intent at the time the bond was issued.
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( T. 71)

Section 41-3-16 Utah Code Annotated (1953) expressly
provides that such bonds may be continuous in form.

Testimony

was presented at trial that the bond in question was a single,
continuous bond and that the $400 premium is considered a per
annum rate which includes an update of service charge.
additional

The

premium is not considered to extend an additional

$20,000 liability against the surety.

(T. 42, 43, 73, 133)

Numerous claims have been made against the principal,
Dick Noren, and the plaintiff, alleging that Noren conducted himself in such a manner as to give rise to liability on the part of
the plaintiff and in favor of each of the defendants.
The amounts claimed by the defendants exceed the $20,000
face amount of the bond.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
AMERICAN MANUFACTURERS' TOTAL LIABILITY
ON THE SUBJECT BOND IS $20,000,
REGARDLESS OF THE TOTAL NUMBER OR AMOUNT
OF THE CLAIMS.
Defendants claim that the liability of plaintiff should
be up to $20,000 per claim.

Plaintiff contends, however, that

its total liability is $20,000 regardless of the number or amount
of claims made against the bond.
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A.

The Bond and the Underlying Statute Must be Read

Together.
The bonding requirement for motor vehicle dealers is
found in §41-3-16 Utah Code Annotated (1953).

The statute now

states:
(1) New Motor Vehicle Dealer's and
Used Motor Vehicle Dealer's Bond: Before
a new motor vehicle dealer's license or
used motor vehicle dealer's license is
issued the applicant shall file with the
administrator a good and sufficient bond
in the amount of $20,000 with corporate
surety thereon, duly licensed to do business within the state, approved as to
form by the attorney general, and conditioned that the applicant will conduct
business as a dealer without fraud or
fraudulent representation, and without
violation of this chapter. The bond may
be continuous in form, and the total
aggregate liability on the bond shall be
limited to the payment of $20,000.
The statutory requirement for a bond was originally passed by the
legislature in 1949, and required a bond in "a good and sufficient amount."

The statute remained virtually unchanged until

1977 when the legislature recognized the need for an increase in
the bond amount.

The amount was increased from $5,000 to

$20,000, but continued to note that "the total aggregate liability on the bond shall be limited" to that amount.

While the

statute has received minor changes in style through the years,
its substantive content has been maintained.
The applicable language of the bond in question,
(Ex. 1), states as follows:
• • • firmly bound to the people of the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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State of Utah to indemnify any and all
persons, firms, and corporations for any
loss suffered by reason of violation of
the. conditions hereinafter contained in
the penal sum of Twenty Thousand Dollars
($20,000.00) lawful money of the United
States • . • •
The lower court held in the instant case that the
foregoing statute must be read in connection with the bond to
determine the nature and extent of the surety's liability.
(R. 242)

This conclusion follows the general rule that the bond

and the statute should be read together.

In Zele v. Industrial

Commission of Utah, 102 Utah 164, 128 P.2d 751 (Utah 1942), the
Utah Supreme Court stated:
In situations where a bond has been given
in compliance with some statutory
provision the provisions of the statute
are read in connection with the provision
of the bond to determine the nature and
extent of the surety's liability.
Id. at
p. 752.
In the Home Indemnity Co. v. State of Missouri, 78 F.2d
391 (8th Cir. 1935), cited in the Zele case, the court also
noted:
The scope of a surety's obligation under
such a statutory bond is prescribed by
the statute in compliance with which it
is given and by the language employed in
the bond defining it.
Id. at p. 393.
Hence, by construing the bond language with the statutory requirement, the liability of the plaintiff surety extends
to "all persons" with a claim, to the "total aggregate" amount of
$20,000 for all such claims together.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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B. The Le islature Intended that the Liabilit of the
Surety was Limited to 20,000 Regardless of the Number or the
Amount of the Claims.
The court should note that although portions of the
statute cited above are permissive in that it provides that the
bond "may be continuous

•

•

.", the penal sum or total liability

of the surety is mandatory, in that it provides the "total aggregate liability shall be limited to the payment of $20,000."

The

legislature, therefore, imposed a strict requirement that the
aggregate liability for this kind of bond be limited to $20,000.
The term "aggregate" as used in the statute has been
defined in numerous cases.
5th Ed.

According to Black's Law Dictionary,

(1979), "aggregate" means:
Entire number, sum, mass, or quantity of
something; total amount, complete whole
•

•

•

In the 1896 case of Chapin v. Willcox, 46 P. 457 (Cal.
1896), a county government act limited compensation to county
officers to $7 per diem and 25 cents per mile in traveling, "all
of which compensation in the aggregate shall not exceed $400 per
annum."

The plaintiff's expenses totaled $487.80, for which he

made demand.

When the amount was rejected, plaintiff brought

suit alleging the limitation of $400 applied only to the per diem
compensation, mileage being allowable over this amount.
court rejected this notion and noted the following:
• • • The legislature has declared that
'all of which compensation in the aggregate shall not exceed $400 per annum each
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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The

year,• thus leaving little, if any, room
for construction.
It would be difficult
to express in more explicit language that
the entire amount which a supervisor in
this class of counties shall receive in
the one year for the services required of
him by law, or by virtue of his office,
is $400.

* * *
If the legislature had merely said,
'all of which compensation' shall not
exceed $400 in one year, both the per
diem and the mileage would have been
included, since 'all' is a term of
number, which includes the several items
making up the basis of the compensation;
but, as if to make its purpose more
clear, the legislature has added that all
this compensation shall not, 'in the
aggregate,• exceed $400 per annum. The
term 'aggregate' implies a plurality()'£
units, whose total amount it re resents.
Id. at p. 457.
emphasis added
The decision of In re Miller's Estate, 110 Pa.Super.
384, 168 A. 807 (1933), gave a similar definition to the term
aggregate as used in a decedent's will.

The will established a

testamentary fund for the granddaughter and authorized advance
expenditure of the interest on the fund for emergencies "not
exceeding in the aggregate $500 yearly."

The court held that

advances were restricted to a total together of $500 and not $500
per emergency.

The court further noted that aggregate was

defined as, "an assemblage of particulars; a total or gross
amount; any combined whole considered with reference to its
constituent part; essentially a sum; considered as a whole;
collectively."

Id. at P· 807.
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.Anchor Cas. Co. v. Mccaleb, et al., 178 F.2d 322 (5th
Cir. 1949), was an action for declaratory judgment construing a
liability policy.

A partnership had obtained the policy in rela-

tion to an oil drilling operation.

While the policy was in

force, an oil well blew up with tremendous gas pressure and raged
out of control for several days.

During this time, oil, sand and

mud were blown into the air and carried onto the properties of
nearby persons by the wind.

The plaintiffs contended that liabi-

lity extended to $5,000 coverage for each accident, and not by
the limit of $25,000 stated for aggregate damage.

The court

found that the damage to the properties was a separate accident
to each of the owners and therefore the company's liability was
$5,000 per person to the extent of the total aggregate liability
of $25,000.

The court found that, "the term aggregate was meant

to serve as a total limit of damage to property of different persons from a closely related series of events such as were evidenced in this case." (emphasis added)

Id. at p. 325.

The cases noted above indicate that the courts view the
term "aggregate" as meaning the grouping of individual parts to
arrive at a sum, the total of all parts considered together.

In

essence, the terms "total" and "aggregate" are redundant for
emphasis.

This would indicate that both terms were used in our

statute to erase any question as to the amount of liability indicated on a dealership bond, i.e., $20,000 total regardless of the
amount or number of claims.
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c.

Case Law Supports Plaintiff's Position that the
Total Liability of this Surety is the Penal Sum Specified in the
Bond.
There is an abundance of case law throughout the country
holding that the maximum exposure of a surety, under a surety
bond required by statute, is the penal sum specified in the bond.
In an action by the administrator of two different
estates to recover on the official bond of a peace officer for
wrongful death of the intestates, the court in Maryland Cas. Co.
v. Alford, 111 F.2d 388 (10th Cir. 1940), stated:
Under the great weight of authority,
surety's liability is limited by the
penal sum named in the bond, even though
different individuals assert claims based
upon distinct wrongful acts of the principal.
(numerous cases listed).
Id. at
pp. 390 and 391.
In Southern Surety Co. v. Bender, 180 N.E. 198 (Ohio
1931), plaintiff filed an action to enjoin the defendant from
having an execution issued or taking any other steps to collect a
certain judgment rendered in her favor in a liability action on
certain official bonds issued by the plaintiff.

Plaintiff had

.

earlier paid in judgment to defendant's husband the full amount
of penalty noted in the bond, and contended no further liability.

The judgment for the plaintiff and decree for injunction

against the defendant were granted.

Defendant argued that an

Ohio statute required a different result.

The statute referred

to stated:
A judgment for one delinquency shall not
preclude the same or another person from
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bringing an action on the instrument for
another delinquency.
Id. at p. 200.
The court, in affirming the trial court, discussed the
weakness of defendant's argument that the surety remained liable
after the total penal sum was exhausted:
The defendant contends that by virtue of
this language a surety remains liable in
succeeding suits on a bond, notwithstanding he may have paid on some
form or judgment the full amount of the
penalty named in the bond. This court
cannot so construe the statute. · It is
true that the purpose of the enactment
was to make the surety liable in successive actions; but the limit of liability
assumed by the surety in official bonds
of this character is the penal sum named
in the bonds. Any other construction
would result in a great injustice and
render it practically impossible to
obtain sureties.
It is also true that the statute must
be read into and construed as part of the
bond, but nothing in the statute or in
the bond indicates that the surety obligated itself to one party, or to separate
parties, for any amounts which, in the
aggregate, exceed the penal sum named in
the bond. Any different holdings are
based upon the peculiar phraseology of
the statute or of the bond. Id. at p.
200.
The above-mentioned cases, together with the obvious
intent of the Utah Legislature that the total aggregate liability
of the bond shall be $20,000, clearly supports plaintiff's position that its total exposure in the instant case is the penal sum
stated in the bond and in the statute, regardless of the number
or the amount of the claims.
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Defendants in their briefs have argued that because the
bond in question does not use the term "aggregate," that the bond
could be construed to be broader and provide more coverage than
the statute.

Cases are cited by defendants holding that a bond

may be executed more broadly than the minimal coverage required
by statute.

In Fountain Green City v. National Surety Corp., 100

Utah 160, 111 P.2d 155 (Utah 1941), and Bamberg County v.
Maryland Cas. Co., et al., 173

s.c.

106, 174 S.E. 917

(s.c.

1934), it is true that the respective courts held that a surety
could lawfully, by contract, increase the amount of the
principal's bond by voluntarily executing a bond in a larger sum
than is required by statute.

However, in both these cases, the

courts extended the surety's liability only up to the actual
amount which appeared on the face of the bond in question.

The

bond in the instant case was issued to comply with the statute
and the penal sum is the same in both the bond and the statute.
The court in Royal Indemn. Co., Inc. v. Special Service
Supply Co., Inc., 413 P.2d 500 (Nev. 1966), also held that a bond
may be conditioned more broadly than is required by statute.
This case is also distinguishable from the instant case in that
the bond under examination contained language which spoke of
"defaults" and "material bills" even though it was issued pursuant to a statute designed to protect persons from unlawful acts
of contractors.

The court, unable to "discard plain words of a

valid contract," ruled the language was inclusive enough to
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encompass simple breaches of contracts.
See also Travelers Indem. Co. v. Housing Authority of
the City of Miami, 256 So.2d 230 (Fla. 1972), and Peters v.
Bechdolt, et al., 100 Ind.App. 395, 192 N.E. 116 (Ind. 1934), in
which the language of the bond specifically extended the coverage
beyond what was required by statute.
All of the cases cited by defendants are therefore
distinguishable since the bond in the instant case does not
clearly or specifically provide greater or broader coverage than
the statute.
D.
If the Bond Language is Ambiguous, Extrinsic
Evidence and Other Relevant Testimony May be Admitted.
The lower court in the instant case held that the bond
language was "unclear" as to whether the $20,000 penal sum is a
per person limit or a per all persons limit (R. 240 - Finding of
Fact No. 6)
It is a well-recognized principle of law that if a bond
or contract language is in any way ambiguous, extrinsic evidence
and other relevant testimony may be admitted.

The Utah Supreme

Court has stated this principle in Big Butte Ranch, Inc. v. Holm,
570 P.2d 690 (Utah 1977):
To ascertain the meaning of the
agreements, the court should first
examine the language of the instruments
and accord it the weight and effect which
it may show was intended and if the
meaning is ambiguous or uncertain, then
consider parol evidence of the parties'
intentions.
Id. at p. 691.
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Since the bond in the instant case does not specifically
use the term "aggregate" which is specifically mentioned in the
statute, extrinsic evidence should be admissible to help the
court determine whether the bond was nevertheless to apply in the
"aggregate."
In Hartford Accid. & Indemn. Co. v. Maus, 260 Or. 203,
511 P.2d 839 (Or. 1973), the defendant was president of Eugene
Escrow Service, Inc., a company engaged in the escrow business.
An Oregon statute required companies engaging in such a business
to provide a bond.

The defendant, Mrs. Maus, secured a bond from

Hartford Accident & Indemnity Company after persuading the defendants George and Mary Pile to sign as indemnitors on the application to Hartford for said bond.

Eugene Escrow Service, Inc. sub-

sequently defaulted and the state was required to make payments
to persons claiming against the escrow company. The state then
obtained a judgment against Hartford, as surety, and Hartford
brought an action for indemnity to satisfy the judgment according
to the provisions of the indemnity agreement.
The Hartford bond application with the indemnity
agreement stated the bond was "to cover real estate license,"
while the bond, when issued, was "bond of escrow agency,"
therefore contradictory.

and

In considering this problem, the court

noted:
Being internally inconsistent, the indernni ty agreement is ambiguous and, therefore, extrinsic evidence may be
introduced to explain the ambiguity.
Id.
at
840.
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Another case which held that extrinsic evidence is
admissible to interpret an ambiguous bond or note was Jones v.
Casstevens, et al., 222 N.C. 411, 23 S.E.2d 303 (N.C. 1942).

In

this case, the plaintiff sold the defendant his one-half interest
in a jewelry business.

The defendant executed his note under

seal for the amount secured by secured deed or trust on a home.
The note contained a provision to the effect that if the defendant defaulted, the note could be foreclosed and the property
sold, but if the sale of the property did not wholly satisfy the
note, the defendant would not be liable for any deficiency
judgment.

The court held in regard to admission of parol evi-

dence concerning the note:
• • • It is the holding with us that
parol evidence is admissible to show an
agreed mode of payment ·and discharge
other than that specified in the bond.
• • • In proper cases it may be shown by
parol evidence that an obligation was to
be assumed only upon a certain contingency, or that payment should be made
out of a particular fund or otherwise
discharged in a certain way, or that a
specified creditor should be allowed.
Id. at pp. 304, 305.
The court in this case recognized the point of law that
parol evidence could be shown as long as it did not conflict with
what had been written.

In the instant case, plaintiffs proposed

extrinsic evidence is offered to clarify any ambiguous language
in the bond in question, not to contradict what has been written.
Siata International U.S.A., Inc. v. Insurance Co. of
North America, 498

F.2d 817 (3rd Cir. 1974), was an action by a
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United States importer of automobiles against a United States
surety on a bond covering the contracts between importer and an
Italian manufacturer for a delivery of a specified number of
automobiles.

A question arose in this case, whether or not the

bond was an advance payment bond or a performance bond.

The

Third Circuit Court of Appeals noted the bond was "a miracle of
ambiguity" and held that:
The district court should have received
evidence to clear up the ambiguity
instead of attempting to construe the
instrument on its face.
Id. at p. 819.
Defendants contend in their briefs that the language
of the bond in question is clear and unambiguous and that extrinsic evidence is therefore inadmissible.

A careful reading of the

bond language itself, however, without the helpful aid of the
statute, may well provide for different interpretations.

This

court has noted before, Bennett v. Robinson's Medical Mart, 18
Utah 2d 186, 417 P.2d 761 (Utah 1966), that where a contract is
susceptible of different interpretations, extraneous evidence is
admissible to show intention.
The cases cited by defendants which have held that
extrinsic or parol evidence is not admissible to interpret a
contract, for the large part, have been cases where the contracts
examined have had clear and specific language and where extrinsic
evidence would tend to vary or contradict the terms of the
contracts in question.

That is not the result in the instant
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case.
E. The Utah Motor Vehicles Business Administration and
the Surety .Industry as a Whole have Always Understood that the
Total Liability and Exposure for a Surety Under a Dealer's Bond
was $20,000 Regardless of the Number or Amount of Claims.
The extrinsic testimony offered at the trial clearly
reveals that the understanding within the surety industry itself,
as well as the understanding applied by the Utah Motor Vehicles
Business Administration, was that a motor vehicle dealer's bond
was limited to $20,000 in the aggregate regardless of the number
or amount of claims.

This is highly relevant in determining the

intent of the parties in using the specific bond language in
question.
At the trial of the instant case, plaintiff called as an
expert witness, Thomas J. Brough, who is the manager of the
Fidelity & Surety Department of Northwestern National Insurance
Company of Salt Lake City.

Mr. Brough explained that the func-

tion of suretyship was related to a credit function and that the
financial standing of the principal, or the motor vehicle dealer,
was critical to the surety.

The reason given by Mr. Brough for

the importance of the financial standing of the principal was
based upon the surety's evaluation to determine the ability of
the principal to indemnify the surety should a claim result in a
payment by the surety.

In connection with the surety's eva-

luation of the ability of a principal to indemnify the company,
Mr. Brough clearly stated that the surety never would consider
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a need to go after the principal for more than $20,000 in the
aggregate.

Mr. Brough's testimony on page 63 of the transcript

was as follows:
Q.
And when the company does this,
does it envision ever going or ever
having to go over the principal for an
amount in excess of $20,000?

(Objections raised)

* * *
So then the company would envision
going after the principals for one 20,000
loss rather than multiples of twenty?
Q.

A. That's correct.
(T. 63, lines
23-25; 64, lines 10-13)
Further, Mrs. Dorothy Berthelsen who testified on behalf
of plaintiff, and who is the manager of an underwriting unit for

.
plaintiff, testified as to her understanding of plaintiff's total
liability on the bond at the time it was issued to the principal.
Mrs. Berthelsen's testimony was as follows:
Q.
And what would be, based upon
plaintiff's Exhibit 1, what is the
understanding of American Manufacturers
as to the total liability on that bond?

A.

$20,000.

Q. What if you have ten people who
each have been defrauded out of $30,000?

A.
It's still the penal sum is
$20,000.
(T. 71, lines 10-16)
Finally, the Director of the Utah Motor Vehicles
Business Administration, John A. Burt, testified that the clear
understanding of the employees in his agency has always been that
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the total liability of the surety for the bond in question in
this case is

$20,000~

regardless of the number or the amount of

the individual claims.

This testimony is critical to the intent

of the parties because Mr. Burt in effect represents the
"obligee" under the bond, or in other words, he is the representative of the people of the State of Utah who are to receive protection from the bond.

Mr. Burt has been with the agency since

1953, and was instrumental in persuading the legislature to
increase the statutory limit of the bond of $5,000 to its present
day $20,000.

(T. 76, 103-104)

Mr. Burt's testimony with regard to his understanding of
the surety's liability begins on page 82 of the transcript:
Q. What is the understanding of your
department as to the total liability of
that bond?

(Objections raised)

* * *
Q.

Do you recall the question, sir?

A.

Talking about this particular bond?

Q.

Yes.

A.

$20,000.

Exhibit 1.

Q.
So whether we have ten claimants
with $30,000 claims of $30,000 each, the
total liability of the surety would be
$20,000?

A.

That's right.

MR. COOK: Objection to that.
leading the witness.

He's
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THE COURT:

Sustained

Okay.
Based upon what you have told me
your understanding is and the
understanding of your department, of the
total liability of the surety; assuming
you have ten claimants with each claiming
a $50,000. What is the total liability
of the surety?
A.

$20,000.

Q.
Regardless of the number or the
amount of the claims?

A.
Yes, sir.
(T. 82, line 30; 83,
lines 13-30; 84, lines 1-3)
The extrinsic evidence presented at the trial clearly
demonstrates, therefore, the intent of at least two of the
parties to the bond.

Both the surety and the obligee, repre-

sented by the state agency, understood that the bond was limited
to $20,000 regardless of the total number or the am9unt of
claims.
POINT II.
THE LANGUAGE OF THE BOND SHOULD NOT BE
CONSTRUED AGAINST THE BOND COMPANY AND IN
FAVOR OF DEFENDANTS.
As previously stated in this brief, the substantive
language of the bond in question was prepared before 1953.

The

form is provided by the Utah Motor Vehicles Business
Administration, although it is not clear who actually drafted the
form.

Almost all of the surety companies which issue .bonds in

Utah use this type of bond form, and they receive it directly
from the Motor Vehicles Business Administration.

The testimony
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of Thomas J. Brough called as an expert witness by plaintiff, and
who was employed as the manager of the Fidelity & Surety
Department of Northwestern National Insurance of Salt Lake City,
clearly supports this contention:
Q.
Okay. Now going back to say the
fall or the last six months of 1978; if a
prospective motor vehicle dealer were to
come and ask your company to provide a
bond, where would you get a form?

A. We would obtain the form from the
State of Utah and issue it on that form.

* * *
Q. Would you explain to the Court what
you have done to determine what other
companies are doing concerning these
bonds of this type?

A.
I've contacted other companies that
I am familiar with that handle bonds in
this area. And discussed with them what
form they use, and on what basis they
underwrite the bonds.
Q.
Now, as of the present, do you know
of any company that is using a form other
than the form that you have before you,
plaintiff's Exhibit 1?

A.

No.

I am not aware of any.

Q.
Do you know what was being done
back in 1978? Were they all using the
same form or did they have different
forms or what was the situation?

A. The procedure would have been the
same then, I am sure.
(T. 46, lines 3-8;
47, lines 5-20)
Further, the testimony at the trial from Mr. John Burt,
the Director of the Utah Motor Vehicles Business Administration,
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amply demonstrates that any deviation from th~ form provided by
the State agency would be rejected because it was not approved by
the attorney general's office.

In that regard, Mr. Burt

testified as follows:
Q.
I guess what you are saying to me is
that the form of Exhibit 1 that states
that it has been approved as to form by
Robert B. Hanson, the Attorney General?

A.
Q.
you?

A.

Yes, sir.
That form would be acceptable to
That's correct.

Q.
Now, if I had someone in my office
type out the language of this Exhibit 1
verbatim, that would also be acceptable?

A.

Yes, sir.

Q.
Now, are you telling me that in the
event that I reworded any portion of this
bond it would not be acceptable?

A.
We would not accept it.
lines 2-14)

( T.

80 I

Testimony at the trial further indicates that the practice of using the State agency form is customarily applied by
surety companies, inasmuch as the State or the public at large in
this case is the

11

obligee 11 under the bond.

(T. 48, 69)

By using

the bond form that has already been approved by the Attorney
General, surety companies throughout the state can rely on the
fact that the form complies with the statutory requirements.
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tion that normally applies to a party that prepares a written
instrument should not apply in this case because the plaintiff
did not prepare the bond in question.

If any party should be

held to this rule of construction, it should be the public at
large since it was their representative that provided the bond
containing the disputed language.
POINT III.
PUBLIC POLICY DICTATES THAT THE TOTAL
LIABILITY BE LIMITED TO $20,000
REGARDLESS OF THE NUMBER OR AMOUNT OF THE
CLAIMS.
If the court were to rule that there is a $20,000 exposure on every claim, bonds would probably be unavailable to motor
vehicle dealers.

Although the court did not permit testimony on

the public policy ramifications, it is true that if defendants
were to prevail, the surety companies could simply not afford to
issue these bond because of the total risk involved.

If an

attempt were made to issue a bond carrying a liability exposure
of $20,000 per claim, the premium would have to be so high that
the cost would be prohibited to virtually every motor vehicle
dealer.

As noted in Southern Surety Co., et al. v. Bender, 180

N.E. 198 (Ohio 1931):
The limit of liability assumed by the
surety in official bonds of this
character is the penal sum named in the
bonds. Any other construction would
result in great injustice and render it
particularly impossible to obtain sureties.
(emphasis added)
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POINT IV.
THE RENEWAL OF THE BOND BY RESPONDENT DID
NOT PROVIDE CUMULATIVE LIABILITY OF
$20,000 PER YEAR.
The bond in question was originally issued on October
31, 1978, upon the payment of a $400 premium.

The bond was con-

tinued in October of 1979, with the additional payment of another
$400 premium.

The lower court in the instant case ruled that the

payment of the additional premium provided an additional $20,000
for claims arising during that second bond period.

Plaintiff has

filed its cross appeal contesting that portion of the court's
ruling.

As previously noted, §41-3-16 of the Utah Code Annotated

(1953), expressly allows that a bond may be continuous in form
and that the total aggregate liability on the bond shall be
limited to the payment of $20,000.
There are many decisions, in other jurisdictions, where
it has been held that a bond and subsequent renewals thereof are
to be construed as a continuing contract which is continued in
force by the payment of annual premiums, and the renewal does not
impose additional liability for each bond period.
Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc. v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of
Maryland, et al., 162 F.2d 264 (7th Cir. 1947), was a lawsuit
involving the criminal activities of a Laurence O'Connoll, who
was bonded in the amount of $20,000 by Fidelity & Deposit Company
on September 1, 1935, in connection with his activities as chief
security examiner of the Industrial Commission of Illinois.
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The

bond in question had no expiration date, and there was no
contractual method for termination by affirmative action of the
parties, nor was there any express indication of an intent to
create successive periods of liability.

The court noted:

It is undisputed that the most pertinent
factors to be considered in the deterrnina tion of whether the liability of a
suretyship bond is cumulative or continuous are the terms of the bond itself
and the acts of the parties in contemplation of the terms of the bond. Id.
at p. 266.
The court also took into consideration the receipts or
invoices for the various annual premiums on the bond and noted
that in each instance, they refer back to the original bond, specifying the number thereof and setting forth the amount as being
the premium due on the various specified dates.

The court held

that the bond was a continuous bond and that the extent of the
liability of the defendant was $20,000.
In the instant case, the receipt or invoice for the
renewal premium referred back to the original bond and number
(Ex. 4), and plaintiff's premium transmittal memo refers to the
payment of $400 as an "annual service charge -- continuous bond."
(Ex. 5)

As in Montgomery Ward, the proper interpretation is that

this bond is a "continuous" bond, which does not provide cumulative liability each year a premium is paid.
Fourth & First Bank & Trust Co. v. Fidelity & Deposit
Co. of Maryland, 153 Tenn. 176, 281

s.w.

785 (Tenn.

1926), was

an action involving a blanket bond which was issued by the defenSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

dant to the Fourth & First National Bank by way of protection
against dishonesty of all the employees of these two banks.

The

bonding contracts between the parties provided for a one-year
term and subsequent annual premiums.
The defendant in this case maintained that the bond
issued to the banks was a continuous bond in the sum of $50,000,
while the bank contended that the original bond and each renewal
thereof for the four years the bond was renewed, were distinct
and separate contracts.

The Supreme Court of Tennessee affirmed

the lower court's decision dismissing the Fourth & First Savings
Bank's bill against Fidelity & Deposit Company and noted that the
extent of the defendant's liability was the sum of $50,000 as
found in the original bond.

The court distinguished cases cited

by plaintiff which have held that certain bonds were not continuous, noting that the bonds in these cases had covered a
specific period, the renewal of the bonds did not take place
automatically, and the bonds were renewed each year only by the
affirmative action of both parties.
In the instant case, Dick Noren, the principal, did not
have to take affirmative action to renew the bonds such as
filling out a new application.

He simply paid the premium after

receiving an invoice for the same and the bond was renewed.
Consequently, the instant case is more similar to the facts in
the Fourth & First Bank case than the cases cited by plaintiff in
~hat

case.
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John Church Co. v. Aetna Indem. Co. v. John Church Co.,
13 Ga. 826, 80

s.E.

1093 (Ga.), was another action on a bond to

recover on the liability of the defendant company upon one bond
for $3,000 and two renewals thereof.

The plaintiff in this

action, alleged that the original bond was made for the purpose
of indemnifying an amount of $3,000 for one year, and that during
the next two subsequent renewals of the bond, new contracts were
made for each year in the amount of $3,000.

The renewal receipts

for the bond were identical except as to date, and as to the particular term for which the bond would be in force.

The language

employed in these receipts indicated they were receipts for a $30
renewal premium on a bond for $3,000 and that as a result of a
$30 premium, the bond was hereby renewed and continued in force
for the period of one year.

The court noted:

While the renewal certificate might be a
new contract, it was only a new contract
as respect to time; that is to say, it
extended the indemnity provided by the
old contract to a new period of time
• • • Id. at p. 1096.
The Court of Appeals of Georgia upheld the lower court's
decision that the bond was a continuing contract and held the
extent of the liability was for $3,000.
According to 7 A.L.R.2d 946, 947, with regard to
liability on a fidelity bond renewed from year to year, a
majority of the cases have held that a bond and the renewal
thereof are to be construed as a continuing contract, which, in
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the same manner as a life insurance policy, is continued in force
by the payment of annual premiums.

The annotation further notes

that the liability of the surety is limited in the bond to a specified amount, and the surety may not be liable in excess
thereof, although the acts giving rise to claims may have
occurred during the different periods of each.
Again, with respect to the extrinsic testimony offered
at the trial, it is clear that the understanding in the industry,
as well as the Utah Motor Vehicles Business Administration, is
that a "continuous" bond provides a total liability of $20,000
and not an additional $20,000 for every year a premium is paid.
Both Mr. Robert Blackham, the agent who dealt directly with the
principal, Mr. Noren, in this case, and Thomas Brough of
Northwestern National Insurance Company, testified that, in their
opinion, the bond in the instant case, marked as Exhibit 1, was a
"continuous bond".

(T. 43, 53)

Further, Mr. John Burt of the

Utah Motor Vehicles Business Administration testified as to his
understanding of how the term "continuous bond" is applied in the
industry as well as by the State agency:
Q.
Are you familiar with a phrase
'continuous bond' versus a renewal or am
I talking Greek to you?

A. No. Continuous bond, as far as
we're concerned is one that we get the
original bond. And the bond runs continuously.
It doesn't have to be renewed
each year. The bond is of a continuous
bond.
Q.
Now, if you have say $25,000 and
say the bond runs from January 1 to
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December 31st of say '78. And then we
have a continuous bond into '79 and a
continuous bond into '80.
If you had a
bond such as Exhibit 1, and you had say
$30,000 in claims in 1 78, and another
$30,000 in '79, what is the total
liability of the surety, based upon the
understanding of your department?
A.

$20,000.

Q.
Regardless of when the claims
arise?

A.

Yes, sir.

(T. 84, lines 4-19)

Based on the cases cited above and the extrinsic evidence offered at the trial, plaintiff respectfully requests that
the court grant its cross appeal and find that the total
liability of the surety is $20,000 regardless of the amount or
number of the claims and regardless of the years for which a premium was paid.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff respectfully submits that its total liability
on the subject bond is $20,000 regardless of the total amount or
number of claims.

The bond and the underlying statute, §41-3-16

Utah Code Annotated (1953), must be read together.

The statute

clearly sets forth not the minimum but the maximum liability
required on the bond with its wording that the total aggregate
liability on the bond shall be limited to the payment of $20,000.
Since there may be some ambiguity in the bond language
itself, the trial court was correct in admitting extrinsic evidence and testimony to arrive at the true meaning of the bond.
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The extrinsic evidence submitted in this case clearly supports
plaintiff's contention that its total liability is $20,000
regardless of the number or amount of the claims, or the years
for which a premium was paid.
The strict rule of construction that normally applies to
a party that prepares a written instrument should not apply in
this case because respondent did not prepare the bond in
question.
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